

Further Thoughts on Two-Tier Pricing



NEPOOL IMAPP Stakeholder Process

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Outline

- Clarifications in Response to Feedback
- Key Objectives
- The Two-Tier Picture



Feedback

- Will two-tier pricing apply to resources with existing state support?
 - In general, no. NRG's proposal is to apply this treatment to *new* state-supported resources entering the market, and to existing resources that receive *new* state support.
- Will the NRG two-tier proposal result in FCM purchases 'on the demand curve?'
 - The results will be very close, if not identically, on the demand curve. By pro-rating the quantity of all obligations, the problem of 'over-buying' is resolved.
- Will the NRG two-tier proposal create incentives to depart from bidding risk-adjusted going-forward costs?
 - As Jim Wilson describes¹, there may be a slight incentive to shade bids slightly higher. Our expectation is that the reduction in risk and the increase in opportunity for two-settlement (PfP) payments will have a larger, offsetting effect.

¹ http://nepool.com/uploads/IMAPP_20161021_NESCOE_2Tiered_Pricing_Analysis.pdf



IMAPP Objectives

- ✓ **States' Objective 1:** Accommodate states' near-term procurement mandates in wholesale markets with existing or revised market rules, to maintain reliability at least cost.
 - ✓ States will be proceeding with mandated contracting processes
 - ✓ According to the States, the existing renewable technology resource (RTR) exemption 'reasonably accommodates' state objectives
- ✓ **Wholesale Suppliers' Objective 1:** Support and accommodate states' policy objectives without bearing the full cost of them through wholesale market price suppression
 - ✓ Just as states insist that policy mandates of one state not impose costs on consumers in another state, state policies should not impose undue burdens on investors relying on FERC-jurisdictional markets.
 - ✓ Wholesale markets are the basis for building and maintaining reliability infrastructure, and need to be free of distortion from entry and exit driven by non-market/non-economic factors



The near-term issue – FCM Price Formation

- ✓ With full application of mitigation, i.e., all resources offering at a competitive level (green supply curve), the clearing price in this example is **\$7.66 / kW-mo**, and the cleared quantity is 35,429MW.

- o The total market cost is $\$7.66/\text{kW-mo} \times 35,429\text{MW} = \mathbf{\$3,257 \text{ million}}$

- ✓ With 1,000MW of State Policy (SP) Qualified Capacity inserted as price-takers (blue supply curve), the clearing price is **\$6.83 / kW-mo**, and the cleared quantity is 35,604MW


- o The total (market) using the blue curve would be $\$6.83/\text{kW-mo} \times 35,604\text{MW} = \mathbf{\$2,918 \text{ million}}$

- o *This is the price-suppression effect of out-of-market capacity*

- ✓ Adjusting the market demand (dotted pink demand curve) leads to similar price suppression. Clearing with the green supply stack, the clearing price would be **\$6.83 / kW-mo**, and the cleared quantity would be 34,604MW

- o The total market cost is $\$6.83/\text{kW-mo} \times 34,604\text{MW} = \mathbf{\$2,838 \text{ million}}$

Illustrative FCM auction pricing





Questions?